Friday, April 11, 2014

The Obama Administration and the Constitutionally-Suspect Status of Affirmative Action in Federal Contracting


                                                                         William M. Leiter

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Abstract
The federal Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) program requires that business owners be certified as disadvantaged discriminates as a basic requisite for the receipt of DBE affirmative-action benefits in federal contracting. A multiplicity of minorities are presumed by federal law to be disadvantaged discriminates, and this deviates from the U.S. Supreme Court’s equal protection of the laws ruling that affirmative action be based on a strong basis in the evidence that unlawful discrimination has occurred. Consequently, the federal DBE-contracting program--the federal expenditure goal for which has been greatly exceeded during the Obama Presidency-- is constitutionally suspect.
Introduction
During the Obama Administration –between FY 2009 and FY2012—federal contract spending for certified small disadvantaged enterprises contractual services totaled some $133 billion or about 8% of total expenditures for federal procurement of goods and services for those years.[1] The 8% exceeds the 5% goal assigned by statute for all federal agencies. Federal procurement expenditures for certified, small disadvantaged business enterprises (DBEs) represent a significant national affirmative-action effort to assist minority and female-owned business through a variety of preferential treatments. There are some thirty-five thousand of these DBEs[2] recognized by the federal government; states and localities have created many others, but there is no accurate count of their numbers.[3] The emergence of DBEs was much associated with the effort to appease African Americans in the wake of the 300 or so ghetto upheavals in the 1960s (resulting in 200 deaths and the destruction of thousands of businesses[4]) as skin color and ethnicity have been critical to governmental certification of disadvantaged status. The creation of African-American DBEs fomented a stampede by other groups insisting on their disadvantaged status, and this fanning of the flames of racial/ethnic/gender grievance successfully garnered further governmental DBE-appeasement.  It was extended not only to cultivate minorities and females, but also to calm the guilt and fear of Americans who have widely harbored the notion that their society had been racially/ethnically oppressive and sexist. Currently, businesses owned and operated by U.S. citizens whose net worth is below $750,000[5] (not counting the value of one’s home and business) can remain certified DBEs (for federal and state/local programs) if the owner/operator is a female or is a member of one of the following presumptively[6] (by federal DBE law) disadvantaged/discriminated against groups:
Black Americans; Hispanic Americans; Native Americans (Alaska Natives, Native Hawaiians, or enrolled members of a Federally or State recognized Indian Tribe); Asian Pacific Americans (persons with origins from Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, Japan, China (including Hong Kong), Taiwan, Laos, Cambodia (Kampuchea), Vietnam, Korea, The Philippines, U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Republic of Palau), Republic of the Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, Samoa, Macao, Fiji, Tonga, Kiribati, Tuvalu, or Nauru); Subcontinent Asian Americans (persons with origins from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, the Maldives Islands or Nepal). [7]
            Surely, the creation of this extraordinary assemblage of presumptive discriminatees was motivated by more than mere appeasement. The effort here, as in other affirmative-action undertakings was to correct our societal deficiencies and to appropriately apportion the benefits of American life, while facilitating the integration of our society. Nevertheless, the clear language of the antidiscrimination laws of the 1960s—and the clear moral imperative of that era—was “color- blindness.” And the DBE programs with their affirmative-action preferences frustrate color-blindness. The ghetto upheavals of the 1960s helped change ideological commitments, as crises often do.[8] Ironically, African-American businesses--for whom DBE affirmative action was originally created[9]--may receive less from DBE programs than others. For example, a study of 2004 DBE contracts issued by the Federal Aviation Administration noted that African-American firms received 23.5% of the DBE contracts (31% of the dollars), while white females obtained 48.3% of those contracts (36.5% of the dollars).[10]

           
Benefits available to DBEs include:[11]
-- Establishment of governmental goals (including goals in prime contracts) for the hiring of minority and female DBE businesses.
--Monetary incentives for prime contractors to subcontract to DBEs as in Adarand v. Pena (1995)[12] discussed below.
--Sheltered markets offering set-asides (which restrict bidding to DBEs) and sole-source contracting where contract negotiation is restricted to particular firms.
--Governmental loans and training.
--Requirements that good faith efforts be undertaken by prime contractors to seek out potential DBE subcontractors.    
            The startling list of presumptive DBE-discriminatees above prompts the question of who--in accordance with the Constitution’s equal protection of the laws requirement-- can be granted DBE-affirmative action benefits.  In this connection, it would be appropriate to better delineate affirmative-action’s dimensions.
Affirmative Action and its Rebadging
Affirmative action differs from other antidiscrimination initiatives in that (1) it targets and seeks to remedy systemic-societal bias (as manifested in public and private illegal action), not malefactors engaged in intentional discrimination prohibited by law ; (2) in separate programs, or as major portions of universal programs, it mandates race, ethnic, gender, sexual orientation, and disability-conscious remedies for the statistical disproportionately-adverse effects -- the so-called disparate impact -- of societal discrimination on protected groups, whether or not specific discriminatory intent on the part of defendants can be isolated; and (3) it seeks to integrate institutions by race, ethnicity, disabled condition, and sex.
            Affirmative action connotes remedial consideration of race, ethnicity, disability, gender, or sexual orientation as a factor, among others, in decision-making about outreach, jobs, government contracting, K-12 student assignment, university admission, voting rights and housing. The goal of this process is to redress the disadvantage under which members of disparately-impacted groups are said to labor. The relative weight accorded to race, national origin/ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation or disability varies from program to program.  Thus, affirmative action remedies range from disseminating job information to preferential employment and admissions practices, classroom integration, the creation of majority-minority legislative districts, set-asides for minority and women-owned businesses,  and court-ordered employment quotas in egregious discrimination cases.
            Affirmative action has been “rebadged.”  The need for “diversity” in school, government agencies, and workplace populations—and the supposed difference in ideas and practices various groups bring-- has become a dominant rationale used to support the race/ethnic/sex/disability-conscious remedies typical of traditional affirmative action. As Congresswoman Maxine Waters said at a Congressional hearing [13] where she successfully argued that there needed to be a law supporting minority/female-inclusion in the federal financial agencies and in federal financial contracting:
 We have known for many years that most of the minorities in these [federal financial agencies and private financial] firms are at the entry level and the lower levels. …We came up with offices of minority inclusion to be created for each of these financial services agencies, so there is someone who is sitting at the table who can say, ah friends, do you not remember that we had a subprime meltdown where minority communities were targeted, where they were talked into no doc loans, and ARMs, that the greatest mortgage foreclosure problems are in those communities.
We think that whether it is the private sector or in the public sector unless you create something inside these businesses or government whose attention will be directed toward solving this problem, it is not going to happen. …
The goodwill statements, we believe in diversity, but the proof of the pudding is … in the eating. We have to take affirmative steps to do something. That is why we did the office of minority inclusion that is being resisted by the same people who resist diversity.

Why this shift to ideational differences to promote affirmative action? For one, diversity theory does not require the demonstration of past or present forbidden discrimination required by the U.S. Supreme Court since 1989[14] as necessary constitutional support for disparate-impact affirmative action. Consequently, a barrier to promoting affirmative action is removed. Ideational diversity, as diversity theory has it, is required to spur productivity and intellectuality, irrespective of past or present discrimination. Additionally, Harvard sociologist Frank Dobbin argues that diversity rebadging was a self-preservation “cover” created by affirmative-action devotees in personnel departments casting about for a theory which could thwart the perceived Reagan Administration’s efforts to reduce the undesired affirmative-action treatment afforded protected groups. Professor Dobbin found a bridge between diversity and disparate-impact thinking in American political thought. To him, mainstream American thinking and disparate-impact theory have both subscribed to fair and equal treatment. Fair and equal treatment and its rejection of racism and comparable invidious animosities, to the advocates of affirmative action, would lead naturally to diverse populations at work and in education.[15] Besides, employing diversity themes lubricates the advance of affirmative action by making its controversial dimensions more politically palatable. Thus, in his Executive Order 13583,[16] President Obama established a “Coordinated Government-Wide Initiative to Promote Diversity and Inclusion in the Federal Workforce.” This Order did not focus on remedying racial/ethnic/gender discrimination through preferential devices. Rather, we are told that “Our Nation derives strength from the diversity of its population and from its commitment to equal opportunity for all. We are at our best when we draw on the talents of all parts of our society; and our greatest accomplishments are achieved when diverse perspectives are brought to the bear to overcome our greatest challenges.” The Director of the federal government’s central hiring agency--The Office of Personnel Management-- said in connection with the above order: "We're going to be very aggressive. We're going to dog this from every angle I can." [17]He drew particular attention to the government's need to hire more Hispanics and disabled people.[18] 
 
Which Business Owners Should Be Eligible For DBE-Affirmative Action Benefits? The Supreme Court and the Equal Protection Standards for Affirmative Action
At the constitutional level, the critical constitutional disputes regarding affirmative action have concerned the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment (applicable to state government) and its “component” embedded[19] by Supreme Court decree in the 5th Amendment’s Due Process Clause which governs the national government. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits any state government from depriving “any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” An important affirmative-action Equal Protection Clause question concerns the level of judicial scrutiny of government action that Clause requires. Should it be "mid-tier" or "strict"?  To survive mid-tier review, an affirmative action program must serve an important government interest, and employ means that are substantially related to that governmental end. On the other hand, strict scrutiny requires a compelling governmental interest, and means which are narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling interest. After years of inconclusive Supreme Court debate as to the merits of mid-tier versus strict judicial review, strict scrutiny was adopted by the High Court for racial/ethnic governmental classifications, first for state government in Richmond v. Croson (1989),[20]  and later for the federal government in Adarand v. Pena (1995).[21] Nominally, intermediate scrutiny was applied by the Court for gender classifications,[22] but that distinction may have been annulled in 1996 when intermediate scrutiny was defined by the U.S. Supreme Court as requiring an “exceedingly persuasive” interest to support governmental gender discrimination.[23] Surely, “exceedingly persuasive” can be incorporated in the nature of “compelling” as it was defined in Croson’s approach to strict scrutiny. There, the Court majority determined that the City of Richmond’s requirement that 30% of its prime public contracts be set-aside for minorities had to be supported by a "strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary" to overcome racial discrimination affecting minority contractors.”[24] The Croson majority went on to describe the kind of “strong” evidentiary basis required to authorize an affirmative-action contracting program by government which Richmond had failed to produce:[25]
There is no doubt that "[w]here gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone in a proper case may constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination" under Title VII [of the 1964 Civil Rights Act[26]] But it is equally clear that "[w]hen special qualifications are required to fill particular jobs, comparisons to the general population (rather than to the smaller group of individuals who possess the necessary qualifications) may have little probative value."  See … Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 620 (1974) ("[T]his is not a case in which it can be assumed that all citizens are fungible for purposes of determining whether members of a particular class have been unlawfully excluded").
In the employment context, we have recognized that for certain entry level positions or positions requiring minimal training, statistical comparisons of the racial composition of an employer's work force to the racial composition of the relevant population may be probative of a pattern of discrimination. But where special qualifications are necessary, the relevant statistical pool for purposes of demonstrating discriminatory exclusion must be the number of minorities qualified to undertake the particular task.

Later the Croson approach to strict scrutiny was applied to national affirmative action efforts in Adarand v. Pena (1995).[27] Note that the Croson Court (in the above-cited quote) accepted disparate-impact theory by saying that gross statistical underrepresentation of protected groups could demonstrate a violation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act ban against discrimination, but only if there was an underrepresentation of workers in these protected groups who were capable of the doing the work involved.
The Supreme Court’s Croson  and Adarand embrace of strict scrutiny in connection with DBE- affirmative action provoked the publication of an avalanche of  “disparity studies” meant to support the view that minority and women-owned businesses were “underrepresented” in government contracting, and thus warranted DBE-affirmative action benefits. According to the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, these “disparity studies” failed to provide the information required by Croson and Adarand. The U.S. Civil Rights Commission--which proclaims its independence and bipartisanship-- has had the function since 1957 of studying and reporting on the implementation of civil rights laws including those of the Constitution. Its reports are impressive. As to disparity studies, the Commission said[28] in 2006 that
            In 1996, the U.S. Department of Justice cited results from disparity studies and other sources to justify the government’s continued use of racial classifications after the Supreme Court’s decision in Adarand v. Pena. …
     Most current [state and local] disparity studies are not only outdated, but have common flaws. They fail to measure availability according to requirements to compare qualified, willing, and able businesses that perform similar services. They use simple counts of businesses without taking capacity into account. The researchers (1) use obsolete or incomplete data; (2) report results in ways that exaggerate disparities; (3) fail to test for nondiscriminatory explanations for the differences; (4) find purported discrimination without identifying instances of bias or general sources; (5) rely on anecdotal information that they have not collected scientifically or verified; (6) do not examine disparities by industry; and (7) neglect to identify which racial or ethnic groups suffer from disparities. …
     The three national studies of disparities—the Department of Justice’s 1996 appendix to its guidance, the Urban Institute’s meta-analysis, and the Department of Commerce benchmark studies—are outdated and inappropriate now to serve as a basis for federal policy or agency action. …
     The [federal] government should conduct new research on disparities nationwide to support both its policy on discrimination in contracting and federal, state, and local jurisdiction’s efforts to narrowly tailor race-conscious programs. Federal officials must discard disparity studies using data that is more than five years old to justify the award of contracts. The government must use current data, not outdated results. . . .When conducting national research on disparities, study directors should. . .develop a rationale for including businesses ready, willing, and able to carry out contract work…and test for nondiscriminatory explanations for group differences.


The Obama Administration, DBEs, and the Demands of the Social Sciences
            As noted, the federal government has granted some 8% of its contract dollars to certified DBEs during the Obama Administration. DBE certification centrally depends on the nationwide presumption established by federal law that minorities and women are disadvantaged and discriminated against in the award of federally subsidized contracts.  This presumption of racial/ethnic discrimination is based on no reasonably recent (last five years or so) study  publicly providing nationwide data as to the availability of capable minority/women businesses and their underrepresentation in the award of federal contracts. Nothing in the way of a study that would satisfy the above-described Supreme Court strict-scrutiny dictates in Adarand/Croson. During the Obama years, the Government Accountability Office published an analysis of DBE certification, but did not question the merit of presuming that racial/ethnic minorities are disadvantaged and discriminated against. Rather, it concluded that insufficient attention was given by the Small Business Administration (the primary DBE certifier) to the long-standing problems of fraudulent representation of minority status, and economic eligibility.[29]
            The presumption of minority and female exclusion and discrimination was furthered in the Wall Street Accountability and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.[30] The President extolled the virtues of the Act, but he did not mention that the Act required the establishment of offices of minority and female inclusion in all the U.S. financial agencies (some 30) which were charged with the responsibility of promoting to the “maximum extent possible” minorities and female participation in federal financial contracting, and in the federal agency workforce. Minorities are defined as Black, Hispanic, Native, and Asian Americans.[31] At the House hearings on this matter, the primary reference was to a Government Accountability Office study on the number of minorities and females in banks and other financial units relative to the number of White males. No data on minority and female capacity or availability was provided.[32] 
The U.S. Department of Transportation has, of late, emphasized its adherence to Croson/ Adarand, and required its state recipients of federal transportation-construction monies to establish DBE-contract award goals in conformity with Supreme Court standards. Some of  the disparity studies conducted under this new emphasis have resulted in the attenuation of presumptive discrimination.  For example, three states have denied presumptive eligibility for some:  Hispanics in California and Oregon; Native Americans in Oregon; and women in Arizona.[33] Overall, though, according to the Transportation Department’s Inspector General, Transportation’s DBE effort suffers from numerous weaknesses: state administrators complain of insufficient guidance as to DBE eligibility; most DBE-eligible firms do not get transportation contracts; ineligibles get DBE contracts; and there is inadequate graduation of DBE firms to non-sheltered status.[34]
            Strict scrutiny demanded by Adarand/Croson assumes--along with social science theory--that the capability, availability of minority/female businesses and their discriminatory treatment are determinable with substantial statistical precision. It may be that social science theory demands too much by insisting that government answer questions “scientifically.”  The questions of comparable capacity, underrepresentation/discrimination admit of numerous reasonable answers. Perhaps government should be left in the DBE area--as it is in so many other areas-- to policy choices rooted in hunches, guesses, political pressures, and other non- scientifically precise prodding. The difficulties in obtaining Adarand/Croson data are illustrated by a federal statute of 2000 authorizing women-owned businesses to obtain federal contract set-asides for business undertakings where women were underrepresented or substantially so. At that point, the Small Business Administration (SBA) determined that there were four areas of underrepresentation: (1) providing intelligence data; (2) engraving and metal working; (3) furniture and cabinet manufacturing; and (4) motor vehicle dealerships. After widespread criticism, the SBA changed its count from four to 31, and during the Obama Administration it was raised to 83.[35] Science or politics?



Copyright 2014 © by William M. Leiter. All rights reserved.




[1] U.S., General Services Administration, Small Business Goaling Report, FY2009-FY2012.  Accssible at https://www.fpds.gov/fpdsng_cms/index.php/en/reports/63-small-business-goaling-report.html

[2]George R. La Noue, Defining Social And Economic Disadvantage: Are Government Preferential Business Certification Programs Narrowly Tailored?  12 U Maryland L J of Race, Religion, Gender, and Class, 274, 277-278 (Fall, 2012).

[3] Id.

[4] Jonathan J. Bean, Big Government and Affirmative Action: The Scandalous History of the Small Business Administration 37 (University Press of Kentucky, 2001),

[5] La Noue, 12 U Maryland LJ of Race, Religion and Gender at 295 (Cited in note 2). Initial certification permits a net worth of less than $250,000. U.S. Congressional Research Service, The 8(a) Program. … October 12, 2012, Summary. Accessible at http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc227649/m1/1/high_res_d/R40744_2012Oct12.pdf Women-owned DBEs need no such economic “disadvantage” if their businesses are substantially underutilized in the marketplace. U.S. Congressional Research Service, Small Business Set Aside Programs….June 15, 2012, 10. See http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/R41945_06152012.pdf

[6]  The law permits the rebutting of presumptive disadvantaged status, but this involves written complaints and hearings and is seldom accomplished. For example, no challenges were made to DBE certification at the Small Business Administration and the Department of Transportation between 2003 and 2011. La Noue, 12 U Maryland LJ of Race, Religion, and Gender at 299. (Cited in note 2).

[7] List of groups quoted from La Noue, 12 U Maryland LJ of Race, Religion and Gender at 282. (Cited in note 2). Bolding added.

[8] See Robert Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government (The Independent Institute, 2013), 258-262.

[9] Bean, Big Government and Affirmative Action, 46-93 (Cited in note 4).

[10] George R. La Noue, Follow the Money: Who Benefits from the Federal Aviation Administration’s DBE Program, 38 The American Review of Public Administration, 480, 494 (February 8, 2008).

[11] U.S. Civil Rights Commission, Federal Procurement After Adarand, September, 2005, 138-152. Accessible at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/080505_fedprocadarand.pdf

[12] 515 U.S. 2000.

[13] U.S. House of Representatives, Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations and the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, Minorities and Women in Financial Regulatory Reform, pp. 8-9, May 11, 2010. Italics added. Available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/file/hearings/111/printed%20hearings/111-135.pdf

[14] Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989), and Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S.200 (1995).

[15] Frank Dobbin, Inventing Equal Opportunity (Princeton & Oxford, 2009), 101-160. The concepts “rebadging” and “retheorization” are from this volume.

[17] Cited by Joe Davidson, Diversity is Among OPM Chief’s Top Goals, The Washington Post, January 11, 2012, Metro Sect. B04.
[18] Id.
[19] See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
[20] 488 U.S. 469.
[21] 515 U.S. 200.
[22] Craig v.Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).

[23] U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 518 .. 515, 535-546.

[24] Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 500.

[25] Id at 501-502. Internal citations largely omitted.

[26] Pub L 88-352, 78 Stat 241, Codified as amended, generally at 42 USC 1471 et seq (2009)

[27] 515 U.S. 200.

[28] U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Disparity Studies as Evidence of Discrimination in Federal Contracting, May, 2006, 75, 76, 79. Accessible at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/DisparityStudies5-2006.pdf

[29] U.S., Government Accountability Office, Steps Have Been Taken to Improve Administration of the 8(a) Program, but key Controls for Continued Eligibility Need Strengthening,  March, 2010, initial abstract. See http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/302582.pdf

[30] Pub. L. 111-203.

[31] Id, Section 342.

[32] U.S. House of Representatives, Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations and the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, Minorities and Women in Financial Regulatory Reform, May 11, 2010. Available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/file/hearings/111/printed%20hearings/111-135.pdf  See also U.S. Accountability Office, Diversity Management: Trends and Practices in the Financial Services Industry and Agencies after the Recent Financial Crisis, April, 2013. Available at  http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653814.pdf

[33] George R. La Noue, Western States’ Light: Restructuring the Federal Transportation Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Program, 22 Geo Mason Civ Rts L J, 1, 54.

[34] U. S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Audit Report: Weaknesses in the Department’s  Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Program Limit Achievement of its Objectives, April 23, 2013, 1-24. See http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/DOT%20DBE%20Program%20Report%5E4-23-13_0.pdf

[35] U.S. Congressional Research Service, Small Business Set-Aside Programs,  June 15, 2012, p. 9, n 55. Accessible at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/R41945_06152012.pdf

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